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Abstract Although people often refer to quality of life and there is a
respectable research tradition to establish it, the meaning of the term is unclear. In
this article we qualitatively study an intervention of which the quantitative effects
are documented as indecisive. We do this in order to learn more about what the
meaning of the term quality of life means when it is studied in daily life. With the
help of these findings we reflect on the intricacies of objectifying and measuring
quality of life using quantitative research designs. Our case is the feeding tube for
patients suffering from ALS, a severe motor neuron disease that rapidly and pro-
gressively incapacitates patients. We studied how these patients, who lived in the
Netherlands, anticipated and lived with a feeding tube in the course of their physical
deterioration. Our analysis shows that the quality of life related to the feeding tube
has to be understood as a process rather than as an outcome. The feeding tube
becomes a different thing as patients move through the various phases of their
illness, due to changes in their condition, living circumstances, and concerns and
values. There are very different appreciations of the way the feeding tube changes
the body’s appearance and feel. Some patients refuse it because they feel it dis-
figures their body, whereas others are indifferent to its appearance. Our conclusion
is that these differences are difficult to grasp with a quantitative study designs
because ‘matters of taste’ and values are not distributed in a population in the same
ways as physiological responses to medication. Effect studies assume physiological
responses to be more or less the same for everyone, with only gradual differences.
Our analysis of quality in daily life, however, shows that what a treatment comes to
& Jeannette Pols
a.j.pols@amc.uva.nl
1 Department of General Practice, Section of Medical Ethics, Academic Medical Centre,
Postbus 22700, 1100 DE Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 Department of Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
123
Cult Med Psychiatry (2016) 40:361–382
DOI 10.1007/s11013-015-9479-y
be and how it is valued shows shows generalities for subgroups rather than
populations.
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Introduction
The meaning of ‘quality of life’ is not well understood. The interest in quality of life
started as a way to include patients’ subjective evaluations in research on the effects
of treatment, besides the usual medical outcome variables. The idea was to
incorporate the possibility that while a particular therapy may solve a medically
defined problem (‘treatment X extends life by three months on average’) the patient
does not actually benefit (‘I live in a permanent state of fatigue and cannot work
anymore’). In this paper we are interested in the measurement of quality of life as a
mode of quantification made in clinical trials and comparable designs. Quality of
life is then shaped as an outcome variable that is assessed through questionnaires.
Scores are aggregated for a particular group of patients, and signify the effect of a
treatment on a certain population.
What is measured when quality of life is measured? The WHOQOL Group
(1995) describes it as ‘‘individuals’ perception of their position in life in the context
of the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals,
expectations, standards and concerns.’’ The description shows the recurrent problem
of measuring quality of life as a subjective evaluation (‘individuals’ perception’)
and/ or as a condition that is evaluated from an external point of view (‘culture and
values systems’). Consequently, some researchers assess quality of life by asking
people for an overall rating of happiness, that is, the grade they would give to
evaluate their life (Pais-Ribero 2004). Yet other measurements, such as the EuroQol
(EuroQol Group 2009) do not contain individual assessments, but establish how
well patients are functioning (‘I have no problems in walking about’). Sometimes
mental health is measured as an indicator for quality (e.g. the Beck Depression
Inventory), and there are questionnaires for different forms of cancer, stroke, ALS
and so on, some used in research, others to evaluate patients’ clinical situation.
Apart from these there are the QALY’s and DALYs that are used in international
studies that asses the ‘Global Burden of Disease’ (see Moreira 2012). These studies
inform the funding and accessibility of treatments and shape health care policy
globally. Apart from these very different assessments, there are many disease-
specific questionnaires on quality of life. However, the contents of these
questionnaires are often not described in detail in the method sections of journal
articles. Often we simply do not know how the researchers operationalized quality
of life.
All in all, the measurement of quality of life has a huge impact on policy and
treatment, but there is unclarity and dissensus on what quality of life should mean.
This makes some authors utterly cynical about its measurement. Quality of life
measurements, they argue, have become strategic measurements demanded by
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public and private sector initiatives, turning them into means for selling treatments
rather than serious assessments (Hunt 1997a, b). Questionnaires that claim to
measure quality of life are tagged onto clinical trials, where ‘quality’ or patients’
experiences of quality are hard to find (Carr-Hill 1991; Carr and Higginson 2001).
The lack of insight into what quality-of-life questionnaires evaluate also leaves
certain observable facts such as the ‘disability paradox’ unaccounted for. The
‘disability paradox’ refers to the phenomenon that people with severe handicaps or
diseases often report a good, stable or even improved quality of life, while other
people imagine that they would be very concerned about their disability (Albrecht
and DeVlieger 1999; Lacey et al. 2011; Gauthier et al. 2007). More semantic
confusion emerges when changes in quality-of-life measurements are interpreted, as
it is unclear whether these refer to actual changes in quality in real life or to
measurement errors. This fuelled the debate on ‘response shift’ (Sprangers and
Schwartz 2010; Ubel et al. 2010; Eton 2010), a term that refers to ratings of the
same phenomenon (e.g. being in a wheelchair) shifting over time.
We sympathise with the idea that it is important to find ways to include patients’
experiences and values in the evaluation of medical treatments. We are, however,
concerned about the way research into quality has developed. Although the global
implementation and impact of quality of life measurements on health policy and
treatment is enormous, we dare to re-open the question about the meaning of quality
of life, to see how its measurement relates to patients’ values, anticipations and
evaluations of treatment.1 Our aim is not to debunk quality of life measurements,
but to explore what these measurements can make visible or not, and how (and if)
they relate to a practical understanding of quality in everyday life.
We start from the suggestion that much confusion on what quality of life might
mean emerges precisely because of the specific way the object ‘quality of life’ is
articulated through its assessment (measuring) and its specific mode of quantifi-
cation. This involves particular assumptions about what quality is and how it is
spread in a population. In order to learn about the meaning of quality of life we shift
the focus away from the scientists deliberating about quality of life, and towards the
clinic and to people living with a severe and progressive chronic disease.2 Our aim
is to analyse what quality of life comes to mean by studying it in the daily lives of
patients. To do this we conducted a theoretically informed qualitative empirical
study. How may we understand quality of life as part of everyday life? In the
conclusions we will return to the question how an understanding of quality as part of
daily life sheds light on attempts to measure and quantify it.
1 See for an early feminist discussion on the pros and cons of the use of randomised controlled trials as a
means to promote health: Oakley 1990, and for more recent discussions e.g.: Dehue 2002; Timmermans
and Berg 2003; Healey 2006).
2 But see for a critical overview of the meanings of quality of life in quantitative science e.g. Thomas,
Gill and Feinstein 1994; Moreira 2012; Warrren and Manderson 2013.
.
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The Case
Our case looks at the lives of people in the Netherlands suffering from ALS
(amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) who are considering obtaining a feeding tube, or who
have been living with a feeding tube for some time. ALS is a severe progressive
motor neuron disease. Because of the degeneration of nerve tissue that instructs the
voluntary muscles, patients are progressively unable to move and the muscles waste
away. The course of the disease is generally devastating: 50 % of patients die from
ALS within 3 years of diagnosis; most patients are dead 5 years after.
A feeding tube (gastrostomy) involves piercing the stomach wall to insert a
plastic tube into the stomach. Fluid nutrition can be fed through the tube, either
manually with a syringe, or through a motor-propelled drip. There are several
methods for tube placement (see Stavroulakis et al. 2013 for a clear description). In
the hospital where we did the study, percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG)
was the most common procedure, as it is elsewhere. With PEG insertion, the patient
has to swallow a scope that illuminates the stomach from within and the stomach
wall is pierced from the inside out, thereby minimizing potential damage to blood
vessels. PEG can only be performed when patients have sufficient lung capacity and
do not depend on breathing devices. PEG placement is done by a specialist, the
gastroenterologist, who in our study was associated with the ALS team and knew
the patients from earlier consultations on ways of dealing with dysphagia
(swallowing problems due to the weakness of the tongue and mastication muscles).
When a patient does not meet the requirements for PEG but can lie on their back,
the radiologist inserts the tube: radiologically inserted gastrostomy (RIG). With RIG
insertion, the stomach is inflated with air and the stomach wall is pierced from the
outside in. The diameter of the tube is smaller than for PEG, fixed less stably, and
the wound needs to be stitched, increasing the risk of infection. The radiologist does
not know the patient and this is one reason why PEG is preferred in the hospital
where we conducted our study. The reasoning here is that as talking becomes
difficult for the patient, and their body has lost much of its strength, a familiar
doctor enhances communication and feelings of safety and trust.
Quality of Life and the Feeding Tube
There are various reasons for considering the placement of a tube, including
excessive weight loss through dysphagia, difficulty with coughing that may result in
(an acute fear of) choking and the risk of getting pneumonia, and excessive time
spent on feeding. The literature on the effects of tube feeding on the lives of patients
with ALS is inconclusive. The big questions in this literature are whether tube
feeding extends life and improves nutritional status, and whether and how it
interferes with quality of life. There is no solid statistical evidence for either of these
effects (Benatar and Katzberg 2011; Langmore et al. 2006).
In terms of the feeding tube, good quality of life is mostly related to the social
event of eating (Vesey et al. 2008), whereas tube feeding is related to physiological
effects such as obtaining enough calories, longer survival and improved nutritional
status (Goyal and Mozaffar 2014; Shintani 2013; Greenwood 2013). Some authors
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warn that withdrawing the possibility of eating through the mouth should be last
resort because of the many meanings attached to eating (Vesey 2013; Aparanji and
Dharmarajan 2010; Todd et al. 2005). Other authors, however, recognize the
problem of having a all-day job in trying to swallow food (Martin et al. 2012), and
see tube placement as a minor surgical procedure (ibid) or a minimally invasive
procedure (Hossein et al. 2011) that will enhance quality of life (Mazzini et al.
1995).
Because there is no clear evidence for the effects on either quality or survival,
some authors argue that the decision to insert a feeding tube should only be made if
improvement of quality or life is to be expected, as opposed to ‘prolonging the
dying process’ (Todd et al. 2004; Angus and Burakoff 2003; Pennington et al.
2002). This may be hard to determine, and patients, their loved ones and clinicians
may all take a different stance towards it (see Kaufman 2015). Others authors argue,
however, that dysphagia itself may be a deficit in quality of life, and that the
physiological benefit of a persons’ nutritional status should be a necessary condition
for placing a feeding tube (Rabeneck et al. 1997). Our study comes at a time when
confusion rules and one might ask whether we should conduct a solid trial to
measure the effects of tube feeding on quality of life (and survival), and if so, what
would the outcome tell us. Our study makes a case to assess this question.
The Study
The Informants
For our study we (SL & JP) interviewed patients whom we met through the ALS
Tertiary Care Centre in the academic hospital in the urbanized region of the
Netherlands, through the ALS Stichting Nederland (a national funding agency for
research into ALS), through social media and through personal connections. The
theoretical design of the study aimed to find patients in different stages of relating to
the feeding tube, varying from anticipation to experienced use. We interviewed 11
ALS patients anticipating (3) or living with a tube (8) or at both times (2). In total
we recorded and/or transcribed 15 new interviews for this study.
We also used observation and interview material our colleague collected for her
study on advanced care planning (Seeber 2014, in preparation), which gave us extra
material on 28 people with ALS who she had followed over at least three
consultations. The observations early on in the trajectory, when patients heard their
diagnosis, were an especially welcome addition, as tube feeding was usually only
considered at a later stage. These allowed us to get an overview of the whole
trajectory and its variations. When we use this material we refer to the author, the
unmarked material is from our new interviews and observations.
Interviewing ALS patients took particular patience from both the interviewed and
the interviewer. Due to muscle weakening, talking could be difficult for informants.
Partners and children supported them by explaining things to the interviewer. Some
informants used a speech computer. Others could not speak at all, and delivered
their story to us in writing or through the spouse. According to Dutch law and
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research codes we did not need the approval of an ethical committee for this study,
but with this particularly vulnerable patient group we took special care to let people
know they could always opt out of an interview or cancel an appointment, which
they sometimes did.
We also interviewed the professionals concerned with tube feeding in our
hospital at different points in time: the gastroenterologist, the neurologist concerned
with diagnosing ALS patients, the nurse specialized in coaching patients with
feeding tubes, and the rehabilitation doctor, who was the central carer for ALS
patients. He helped us to approach patients by handing out our information letter to
them. If patients wanted to participate voluntarily, they could tell the doctor or
nurse, who would then give us their contact details. We discussed our results with
the rehabilitation doctor to check our findings and interpretations.
Besides interviews, we observed three consultations of patients and their partners
who came in to discuss tube feeding with the gastroenterologist, and two
consultations with the specialized nurse. This is how we learned what the specialist
told patients about tube placement and living with a feeding tube. When patients
arrived here, they already had discussed the consequences of tube feeding with the
rehabilitation doctor. Due to the ‘lack of clear evidence’, his approach was tailored
to the specific situation of the patient, who ultimately had to decide for or against
having the tube. When possible, we observed patients using the feeding tube, or
asked them detailed questions about using it, turning the patients into ethnographers
of their own situation.
Methodology
This research builds on earlier studies in empirical ethics into care practices related
to the concept of dignity (Pols 2013a, b). Empirical ethics ethnographically studies
‘normativity in practice’ (Pols 2013a, b, Pols 2015; Willems and Pols 2010; Mol
2010; Thygesen and Moser 2010). Normativity can take different empirical shapes,
and refers to (attempts to) do what is ‘good’, where what is ‘good’ is not given but
has to be established empirically. There may be norms to follow, values to put into
practice, ideals to strive for, tastes to appreciate, judgements made or prescriptions
implemented. From the exploration of what dignity might mean in care we learnt
that it is helpful to distinguish between ethical and aesthetic values. With ethical
values we refer to principles that are valid for everyone, everywhere. An example is
patient autonomy that should be respected everywhere. On the other hand, aesthetic
values show the differences in what people value—proverbially, different people
have different tastes.
This does not mean that preferences are products of authentic individual desires;
these are embedded in a wider social-cultural context. Importantly, aesthetic values
may have more or less moral weight. It was the combination of situated, relational
and contingent nature of aesthetic values related to dignity that together with their
heartfelt moral weight made them hard to deal with in common ethical repertoires.
The category of aesthetic values opens up matters of what is stylish, tasteful,
embarrassing, degrading, or ‘of good quality’. We take quality of life as a broader
value than dignity, as it may relate to aesthetic values that carry less moral weight
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than dignity does. The importance of, say, that nice cup of tea every morning, or the
joy of hearing one’s favourite music may be crucial to a particular person’s
appreciation of life, but it would not easily stir moral controversy. Aesthetic values
that are part of what gives life its quality may thus also concern the less normative
and less socially enforced appreciations people might have.
The distinction between ethical principles and aesthetic values is relevant
because, just like statistical methods, each approach deals with differences between
people and situations in particular ways. Principle ethics looks for general values
that count for everyone. Morally speaking, individual peculiarities are irrelevant as
the principles articulate what people have in common (autonomy, freedom, equality
for the law). Rawls’ veil of ignorance is meant to erase individual differences in
position and status from just decision-making. Statistical calculations are also ways
to articulate general tendencies, this time not in terms of universal laws, but in terms
of generalizable probable effects of interventions on populations. Again, individual
differences are mostly trivial—a person’s appreciation of expressionist painting is
irrelevant to the establishment of treatment effects. General effects (e.g., fatigue)
can be made visible, but differences between people on variables other than those
defined as outcome variables disappear from the average. Aesthetic values or
matters of taste differ for different people, and are not necessarily divided following
a Gaussian curve in a population of patients. Therefore, by articulating them we
create space in our analysis to see how these differences play out in the patients’
assessment of the feeding tube, and how these assessments would relate to general
assessments of quality of life.
To anchor our interest in the differences between people in our methodology, we
distinguish between (anticipated) changes in life related to tube feeding and the way
patients value these changes. We analyse quality as either a normative or a
descriptive category. The normative meaning of quality makes the word stand for
something good, like a talent, a virtue, a preferred activity or a capacity.
Colloquially this meaning of quality is used in sentences like: ‘I opt for quality of
life rather than treatment’. Quality is then good in itself, it expresses value. This is
the way quality of life is interpreted in quantitative research, measuring more or less
or average, ‘overall’ or ‘health-related’ goodness.
The second meaning is descriptive, as in ‘qualitative research’ that describes a
type of research rather than praises it. In this descriptive sense, quality refers to a
characteristic or property that has yet to be evaluated. When quality is a
characteristic, the question if a certain treatment leads to more or less quality of
life is meaningless; it would translate as the question whether life with or without a
treatment has more or fewer characteristics. It is, however, relevant that a treatment
may lead to different characteristics of life for different people. So our distinction
forms an analytical sensitivity to learn how and where characteristics and their
valuations hang together, where they differ, and where it is useful to discern them or
not.
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Research Questions
Our questions are: What kind of intervention is the feeding tube? What
characteristics and appreciations does anticipating or living with a feeding tube
bring to ALS patients’ daily lives, and (how) does this differ between patients and
situations? What does it teach us about the meaning of quality-of-life measurements
as a method for evaluating the feeding tube?
Results
The Enigmatic Character of the Feeding Tube: The Hospital
In the hospital where we conducted our research, ALS patients clearly tend to
postpone the decision on taking a feeding tube as long as they possibly can; this fact
is also reflected in the literature (e.g. Stavroulakis et al. 2013),. The gastroenterol-
ogist preferred inserting tubes earlier, when patients were relatively fit and could
benefit from the nutrition and not having to spend all day trying ingest food. The
gastroenterologist was not sure that the patients fully understood what getting and
living with a feeding tube actually entailed, as many of those who opted for late
placement died within 3 months of treatment.
The concern about postponing tube placement was strengthened by a failed trial
in the neurology department (Van der Graaff, in preparation 2014). The researchers
wanted to compare two conditions. In the first condition, patients decided when to
get a feeding tube; in the second the doctors decided the timing. The trial was never
conducted because patients did not want to enrol. The reasons they gave for refusing
to participate were mostly along the lines of ‘they were not ready for a feeding tube
yet’ and had ‘enough on their plate’. They did not want to run the risk of being
assigned to the condition where the doctor would decide. The trial failed, but this
failure is significant as it shows the emotional weight patients attach to the
placement of the feeding tube, and their reluctance to have it. The decision to take a
feeding tube is complex. In our study we systematically mapped these complexities
by following the trajectory of patients anticipating a feeding tube, and their life with
it after they obtained it, at various points in time. We now show how the identity of
the feeding tube changed in the course of patients’ trajectory.
Characteristics and Appreciations Change Together
From Symbol of Deterioration to Eraser of Complaints and Concerns
When they receive their diagnosis, the ALS patients has to face a radically new
perspective on life and a very concrete view of their impending death. Seeber et al.
2014 show that the diagnosis is a shock from which most patients have to recover
before they can reorganize their lives. They usually start at the end: they anticipate
how they will die and discuss their wishes for care at the end of life with their GP
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(ibid). The trajectories are different for different patients, and the feeding tube is one
of many issues that they have to come to terms with.
When they do not suffer from dysphagia yet and there is no problem with weight
loss, the patients in our study had tube feeding on their list as something they might
need later. But this ‘later’ was characterized by an image of decline in ways they
would rather not think about if they could avoid it. At this point, the feeding tube
was a scary symbol of deterioration or even an imagined limit to a life worth living.
Patient Piet looks back:
You see, that’s another change of horizon. When it all started I said: when I
get to the point where I need a [feeding] tube, really, that’s when I don’t want
to go on. But then I never wanted to be in a wheelchair. And now I say to my
wife: ‘‘Come on, give me a push, let’s go out together!’’ So we’ll have to
see… (Seeber, unpublished material)
The patients took the progression of their disease one step at a time. What added
to the negative identity of the feeding tube was that the patients found the procedure
of placing the feeding tube terrible. The literature describes tube placement as a
minor surgical procedure (Martin et al. 2012), or a minimally invasive procedure
(Hossein et al. 2011). This may be true for the doctors, and comparable examples
have been reported where physicians downplay the effects of their treatment.3 In our
case, however, without exception patients agreed on the gruesomeness of the tube
placement procedure. They anticipated the placement fearfully and afterwards
reported on the horror of being put in an awkward, powerless physical position,
finding it hard to breath and having to swallow the scope, which sometimes caused
spasticity and blocked the larynx. The procedure demanded hospitalization, which
implied a displacement from where the patients had their support and technological
adaptations. The weaker the body, the harder the placement procedure was for them.
There was a remarkable consensus among patients in their evaluation of tube
placement, with the main variations mentioning just how terrible it had been, even if
the doctor thought the procedure had gone smoothly and quickly.
Although some patients said that their own opinion was not of primary
importance in the decision to get a feeding tube (‘‘I had no choice…’’; see also
Vesey 2008), for other patients, it was. Typically, these patients’ narratives, like
Piet’s quoted above, showed a turning point. The identity of the feeding tube
changed.
Interviewer: Can you tell me what happened to make you need a feeding tube?
Mr Jansen: I have problems swallowing, and I choke. And eating takes a very
long time… One month, two months ago, eating dinner took the whole
evening. I can’t swallow food. So that’s why, really. […] And then it takes you
more than an hour to eat. It takes so much energy. And you leave lots of food
on your plate, because you give up trying. So then I lost weight, I was
underfed. And I lost more and more weight. So at a certain moment… We
3 An example is Claire Wendland’s (2007), that shows how a cesarian section is not seen as a ‘health
consequence’ of treatment because it is intentionally created.
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have a very good doctor and she wanted to do it [the placement] before she
retired. So we had to think about it a lot, before we accepted the feeding tube.
Interviewer: What did you have to think about?
Mr Jansen: Well, of course, the fact that you have such a thing in your stomach
wall!
Mrs Jansen: Yes, you considered the down side, eh? But then, this explanation
[by the doctor], that was really nice. She told us everything about it. And then
we knew it just had to be done. We [the family] decided immediately. But
Hans [Jansen] said: I don’t want it. So we took a leaflet home, deliberated,
considered. That was Wednesday. And then, the other day, [to husband:] you
choked terribly, [to interviewer:] he chokes every day, but this time we
thought: ‘‘this is the end’’. And the boys [sons] were there and we said to
Hans: ‘‘What do you want? Do you want to choke?’’ And then he said:
‘‘You’ve convinced me.’’ And he sent an email on Friday, straight away. [to
Hans:] And you even looked forward to it!
The idea of a feeding tube changed for Mr Jansen when he could see that the tube
would not only be awkward and disfigure him, but it would provide things that were
of value to him. For him it meant no more choking, no more fear of choking to
death, no more struggling to eat, which no longer tasted so good anyway, and no
more weight loss. As his wife reported, the prospect of leaving all this behind was
something Mr Jansen actually started to look forward to. The feeding tube turned
from a symbol of deterioration into a means towards an end: it became an eraser of
complaints and concerns.
This is an example of how the characteristics of life with a feeding tube and the
value of these characteristics intertwine and change together. In every-day life, the
feeding tube became a different object. The tube now provides valuable
opportunities rather than solutions to problems Jansen did not experience. These
possibilities outweighed his primary, self-evident reluctance to ‘have something in
your stomach wall’. This was not something he would ever consider for trivial
reasons. The extremely scary event of nearly choking to death, however, was the
tipping point to realising that a tube could be applied for good reasons. This shift not
only relates to a psychological process or change in perceptions, as in response shift,
but to a process of shifting physical qualities. When regarding the shift in these
terms, the tube is a rational response to a changed situation rather than an
inexplicable change in values.
It is also possible that only the patient’s opinion changed, even if the situation
didn’t. Mrs Geerts explains her husband’s lack of interest in food.
Some things take care of themselves, things you can’t do any more, like going
out. I remember I couldn’t ride my bike. At a certain point you start hating
cycling because it’s so hard to do, you can’t get on or off the bike, you see. So
then it’s not a problem that you can’t cycle. It’s like that: things are just not
possible at a certain point. Then the need disappears, even if you’ve always
liked getting out. We travelled a lot, we were always out and about. You can’t
do that any more, and now it would really bother me if I had to pack my
suitcase, so to speak. You can compare it to that!
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This change in preference is often called a ‘response shift’, which is defined as
involving ‘changing internal standards, values and the conceptualization of quality
of life’ (Sprangers and Schwartz 1999). The phenomenon to be explained is a
change in the way people answer questionnaires, or as Eton (2010) says:
‘‘[R]esponse shift is […] a theory that helps us understand how certain psycho-
social processes can affect how people answer questions on health-status measures
(p. 930)’’. It is also described as cognitive resonance reduction by psychologists
looking for patterns in human behaviour; the same phenomenon (eating, cycling) is
judged differently. We did not observe this phenomenon in anticipations about the
placement of the feeding tube. Only when the feeding tube could actually solve
problems would people change their mind about it.
The shift in the situation, to when choking becomes a real concern, makes it
understandable why people postpone taking a feeding tube. It is not because they
fail to understand how the tube works or value it in strange ways, but because it does
not solve real problems in a life already full of difficult medical issues. If a feeding
tube only solves problems that might occur at a later stage, people postpone this
radical treatment in the hope they will never need it. The time to face it is when
dysphagia does become a severe problem. Consequently, these people opted for
tube placement very late in their trajectory, which made the procedure harder to
bear, while the gains of being tube-fed were less (see below).
The Tube as Facilitator of Happy Events and as Transformer of Misery
The identity of the feeding tube as eraser of complaints changed again. When people
evaluated the feeding tube positively, the tube became either an eraser of complaints
and concerns, or a facilitator of happy events. The latter happened when patients
discovered that the time formerly spent on eating could now be spent on meaningful
things. The patients described various happy events the feeding tube facilitated.
Paradoxically, and different from the juxtaposition between the pleasure of eating
and the necessity of tube feeding suggested in the medical literature, the tube
permitted new ways of enjoying food and eating. Eating and tube feeding are not
mutually exclusive, which is a common and sorry misunderstanding. Once the
pressure was lifted to obtain enough calories, eating – or rather tasting – could be
organized in new, enjoyable ways, albeit in another form. Eating had to be reshaped,
and related to food that is not too liquid, or too fragmented, yet tasted good. It did
not have to be ‘healthy’ or ‘fresh’ food, which puzzled some patients and their
carers. Good taste, swallow-able food and pleasure were what mattered. One patient
ate one or two cookies a day for the joy of chewing.
Partner: Eating was very difficult, and it took a lot of time.
Jenita: I was busy eating the whole day.
Partner: And obsessively, eh, because it is also a fight against losing weight. It
was really tense. And now, with the feeding tube, she wins lots of time and
energy that does not go into eating and worrying about food. She eats soup,
custard, whipped cream, all the things she really likes. And it’s no longer the
main thing, or a necessity.
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For Jenita, eating had completely lost its attraction because of the difficulty she
had with swallowing. With the feeding tube in place, the calories were taken care of,
and Jenita could engage in eating in ways she liked. The substance of the food
narrowed the possibilities (not everything can be swallowed easily, and not every
taste can be made swallow-able), but within these restrictions she could eat the
things she enjoyed in a relaxed way. Eating could become a pleasurable activity
rather than a necessity to survive.
Mrs Velds: You really like yoghurt, Greek yoghurt. And we put fruit in it, a
mashed banana, that’s what we did.
Mr Velds: Or a mergpijpje [a meringue coated in marzipan and chocolate]
every now and then.
Mrs Velds: [laughs] Yes, a mergpijpje, something sweet, he likes that. Its soft.
Mr Velds: And yesterday we had chicken tandoori.
Mrs Velds: Yes, just for the taste. We mashed it, really crushed it because the
bits of it are really hard. But he likes it anyway, so we put a little on his plate
with something.
Mr Velds: With asparagus, yes. [laughs]
Interviewer: Also mashed?
Mrs Velds: Yes, yes! […] And now and then an alcohol-free lager, or just a
beer. Like yesterday.
Mr Velds: Two! [smiles broadly. Mrs Velds and interviewer laugh too]
Clearly the couple had great pleasure in helping Mr Velds re-enjoy the taste of
food. Disconnected from the need for calories and food intake, they made tasting
food ‘choke proof’. One patient we interviewed, who was treated in peripheral
clinics rather than an ALS centre, was not informed that she could ‘eat’ in both ways
[with or without the tube]. This meant she lost the opportunity to gain pleasurable
experiences, as she did not use the tube until she ‘really needed it’ and had to give
up eating.
Besides the food lovers, there were also patients who had never found eating
much fun. To them, the feeding tube meant ‘good riddance’ to an exhausting task.
They had ‘never been big eaters’ anyway and could do very well without the hassle
of daily meals. They would rather spend their time on other things.
Gastroenterologist: The tube does not give quality of life in the sense that it
cures a patient, because they cannot be cured. The only quality it gives is that
people say that they did not enjoy the social aspects of eating so much,
‘because it takes me hours to eat, my food gets cold’. Well, we give them
plate-warmers, we do everything possible to facilitate eating. But at a certain
point people say: ‘Oh, I’m so tired of it.’ I had one patient, he was an artist, a
painter, who because of his ALS could only draw dots. He’d go to the zoo, and
he’d would make dots with his pencil, make drawings just out of dots. And he
said to me: ‘‘Thanks to the tube I have won so many hours in a day. I have
only a couple of hours in the day when I am not too exhausted to draw my
dots. Before, I used those hours for eating, and now I don’t have to do that
anymore!’’
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The example shows that the feeding tube might allow for positive characteristics
that do not in themselves relate to the tube, but are facilitated by it. So when the
tube is not a positive characteristic in itself, it is important that patients consider
what they could do with the time won by obtaining a tube.
The tube became a transformer of misery that swapped one form of unhappiness
for another. This happened for people who could not administer their own tube
feeding due to lack of muscle power and had no informal carers to do it for them.
Particularly when they needed regular feeding (e.g., every two hours), the feeding
tube could be a major source of misery or loss of goodness.
James: You’re right, I don’t spend hours stuffing myself with food anymore…
Still, my daily life has not improved. It’s even worse as I am stuck at home
now, waiting for the nurses to help me with the feeding bags (Seeber 2012).
James had to wait for professional carers on their erratic schedules to put the bags
of artificial food on the motor-propelled drip he was on. Here the feeding tube gets
its particular identity by the way it shapes and is shaped in the daily lives of patients.
The tube does not function ‘by itself’, as a thing with relatively autonomous
qualities and workings. It obtains its identity ultimately in the circumstances in
which it is put to use, facilitating some things and making other things harder.
Differing Appreciations
Transformation of Misery Versus the Facts of Life
We have seen how the characteristics of both an appreciation of the tube and living
with it changed together. But some valuations of similar events differed remarkably
among patients. This became obvious when it concerned the valuation of ‘‘having a
plastic tube sticking out of one’s belly’’. Some patients had decisive reasons for
objecting to that.
Interviewer: So it’s preventive, but you’d like to postpone it as long as
possible.
Harry: Yes, obviously, it’s terrible, having a plastic tube coming out of your
tummy.
Interviewer: What exactly is so bad about that idea?
Harry: Well, it’s plastic, where you don’t expect it. Or want it.
Lene [spouse]: Like you all [ethicists] say, it damages your physical integrity
[the meaning of integrity refers simultaneously to the wholeness/ intactness of
the body and to its violation, JP].
Harry: The first of the invasive things is the breathing device. But that’s from
the outside. And if you take off the mask, after ten minutes it’s as if you never
wore it. But the tube will always be there [you cannot take it off]. And
unfortunately you can get a button [a flat plastic disc that closes the tube and
hides the hole in the stomach. It demands agility to remove it and connect the
syringe to an extension of the tube, but it produces a better aesthetic effect
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than the roll of plastic tubing taped to the patient’s trunk] only after three
months. Honestly, I thought that I could have it [the button] right away. So
that’s a bit of a disappointment.
The reluctance to have a tube by its relation to the sensual qualities of the body
surprised the gastroenterologist, who saw maintaining physical fitness and longer
survival as the ultimate goals, and the feeding tube as a means towards this end
(‘‘It’s your life-line!’’). The more social, erotic and aesthetic meanings of the body
were hard for the doctors to imagine in the face of issues of life, and death, and
solvable problems. The gastroenterologist said in an interview that she had had the
same experience with patients who had fallen victim to the first AIDS epidemic;
they all wanted a button, caring about the way their body looked and how they
would sense it. The doctor found this hard to understand in the face of death, but it
points to the more sensual ways in which people use and live their body. Having
one’s bodily integrity broken by a disfiguring tube—made out of a material that jars
with the tissue which bodies are made of and that protrudes for others to see—could
be a major problem. The rehabilitation doctor confirmed that some people reject the
placement of a feeding tube for this reason. They rather live and die without the tube
(see also Sakellariou 2013). Experienced PEG-users hid the tube with a sash or band
of cloth around the body, so it would not show when a person was naked or in a
swim suit. This is not an aid commonly suggested to people with ALS, but was a
creative way to deal with concerns about how the body looked.
These sensual concerns with the feeding tube were very important and heartfelt
for some, yet others were completely indifferent to it.
Interviewer: What did you think about having the tube sticking out?
Jenita: [Waves hand dismissively]. It’s not important. The benefits are. It’s not
that I particularly like it; but it’s not an issue.
Obviously the feeding tube is not the same thing in Harry’s or Jenita’s lives.
Again, something happens to the identity of the feeding tube. Yet this time it is not
due to the characteristics of the environment in which the tube gains its function, but
through a different sensual appreciation. For those who value the sensuality and
appearance of their body highly, the feeding tube would be a transformer of misery.
Where once they suffered dysphagia, fear of choking and weight loss, they now
suffer from having a deformed body. For those who cared less about this type of
aesthetics, the tube did not add to their suffering.
Jenita’s indifference to these concerns reveals something else, too. Apparently,
people take some qualities as ‘facts of life’ and accept them as givens. These
characteristics come with the feeding tube, but Jenita does not judge them as
relevant to the value of her life. Something comparable seems to be at stake with the
disability paradox. People do not judge their life as a handicapped person in
comparison to a life without impediments. They have become a fact of life. They
form the ‘givens’ after which everything else follows. Rather than ‘‘balancing
positive and negative qualities’’, as Albrecht and DeVlieger (1999) suggest,
qualities shift in the way they are valued. When the researchers asked people about
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quality of life, they would ask themselves whether there were matters they enjoyed
or found of value.
Mrs Ralphs: I just had my birthday. And they [her three kids] put on a heart-
warming party for their Mum. And my mind is clear. There are many days
with a silver lining.
Mrs Ralphs can no longer get out of bed, but she sees her life as valuable because
of the events and characteristics she values positively. Rather than dwelling on what
she has lost, she lists the positive things in her life. Disease is not in the calculation,
unless there are symptoms such as nausea and fatigue that hinder her ability to
experience the good things. These pervasive symptoms are the negative quality
judgments that Albrecht and DeVlieger describe. Rather than being in balance, they
overrule the possibility for enjoying the positive.
That a new condition of the body becomes a given is also visible in research into
the experiences and training of people with other chronic diseases or disabilities.
For example, studies of COPD patients show how ‘accepting’ their new conditions
and (im)possibilities formed an important theme in their rehabilitation (Pols 2011).
If they did not redefine their horizon of physical possibilities, they would keep
running into trouble. The opposite pitfall was the fatalistic assumption that any
attempt to improve their situation would be useless (Habraken et al 2008). The job
of these chronic patients was to learn to live with their incurable disease rather than
hope for its disappearance. This is a typical assignment for people with chronic
illnesses. They have to live with ‘changed givens’, and try not to let these things
erase what is of value in their lives.
Discussion
In our quest for quality related to the feeding tube in daily life, it turned out the
feeding tube had different identities. The feeding tube changed character depending
on the shifting situation of the individual and played an active part in establishing
the various situations. At first, the feeding tube began as a frightening symbol of
deterioration, linked to gruesome placement procedures and hospitalization. The
tube’s bad image changed when it became an eraser of complaints and concerns,
offering a solution to problems patients actually experienced. This change in
identity made the timing of the placement so difficult. Often the best time for the
placement procedure is when the body is relatively fit, so that it might benefit from
good nutrition and is resilient enough to deal well with the surgery. However, at this
stage the tube has its negative symbolic identity. This was not the case for patients
who had dysphagia without suffering other symptoms (bulbar onset). To them, the
tube provided a solution relatively early in their trajectory. However, patients
without dysphagia but suffering from paralysis of the limbs (limb onset) had to
anticipate whether the tube could be of use to them in the future, at a point when
they regarded the tube as a sign of a very bad life rather than a solution to a problem.
The tube did not keep its identity as an eraser of complaints and concerns. One
step further in the trajectory the tube became either a facilitator of positive activities
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or a transformer of misery. The problem with the positive activities was that the
patient’s ability to engage in valued activity deteriorated. This also explained why
the patients with bulbar-onset ALS were happiest with their tube. The tube would be
placed when they could still walk and use their arms. Dysphagia and weight loss
were their key problems at that time. When these problems were removed, they
could spend their time and energy on things they valued, thus turning the tube into a
facilitator, with the tube and its management becoming possibly more neutral
givens.
Again, this was different for people with limb-onset ALS. To them the tube
solved the dysphagia problems, but did not facilitate anything good (when people
could not move or concentrate), or gave rise to undesirable events (waiting for the
nurse all day). By the time they opted for the tube they could be completely
bedridden and close to their death. This is also striking in the sample of patients in
the study by Stavroulakis and colleagues (2014): 27 patients volunteered to be
interviewed about their tube 3 months after placement. Five of them died before the
interview could be conducted, and the condition of eight patients had deteriorated so
severely that they had to withdraw. It is a small sample, but significant in that nearly
half of the patients dropped out within 3 months after placement. It points to the
urgency to consider who could benefit from a feeding tube, or not.
How could the tubes’ identities be so changeable and different for different
people? The feeding tube took its shape in the situation in which it was put to use. In
itself, the feeding tube did not do much. Its effects and workings emerged in
interaction with many variables: the condition of the patient, the availability of
informal carers, the required frequency of feeding, the time of placement in relation
to their trajectory, and so on. The feeding tube can best be understood not as an
intervention that causes ‘impacts on quality of life’, but as a technology or
prosthesis that may bring different qualities and appreciations that may shift over
time, depending on the way it can or cannot be made to fit in with the patient’s
possibility and values.
Re-visting the Disability Paradox and Response Shift
We can now re-interpret Albrecht and DeVlieger’s (1999) explanation of the
‘disability paradox’ and show why it is incorrect. Rather than balancing goods and
bads, as these authors suggest people do to provide an estimation of their quality of
life, we saw that people answer questions about their quality of life by interpreting
quality in a normative way: they report the good things they still experience.
Moreover, they do not observe their lives by comparing the situation of their being
disabled to the situation before—it there ever was one. Their handicaps have
become the ‘facts of life’, the givens that set the stage on which quality may be
experienced or not. The ‘bads’ mentioned in de quotes in Albrecht’s and
DeVlieger’s paper are all general responses to treatments, like constant pain
fatigue and and inability to communicate (p. 984). People do not ‘balance’ these
‘bads’ so that these can be ‘factors that influence quality of life’. Rather, these bads
directly interfere with the possibility to have positive experiences at all.
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When this analysis is correct, it is hazardous to take ‘functioning’ as an indicator
of quality of life. Of course one would not want a treatment to have the effect of
reducing peoples’ functioning. This is, however, better understood as an effect on
health rather than as a matter of normative quality (experience of a good life), as the
latter is not correlated with functioning in a straightforward way. One can indeed be
disabled and lead a fulfilling life (Hoppe 2013). When quality is to be understood as
relating to what people value and how they evaluate their lives, physical functioning
in itself does not influence that in an unequivocal way.
Our findings also add to the understanding of response shift, or the observation
that people may judge the same situation differently over time. As we showed, not
only peoples’ standards may change, but quality of life cannot be well understood
when not taking actual events and processes into account. The tube may turn from a
scary symbol of deterioration into an actual solution to a real problem; handicaps
may become givens rather than deviations and undesirable states. The emergence of
actual events (physiological reactions, functioning) and their appreciations (values,
context) are related in complex ways. Now these are studied separately by either
biomedical researchers, or social scientists. An ethnographic approach that takes
both events and their meanings and contexts into account, may help bridge this gap.
Measuring Quality
What does this imply for research that does measure ‘the impact of the feeding tube
on quality of life’? We could signal some problems inherent to research into quality
of life. A first problem was that for ethical reasons, most prominently the emotional
weight patients attach to the feeding tube, a randomized trial under standardized
conditions is not feasible or desirable. The failed trial described in the introduction
illustrated this. The patients did not consent to handing over control about the timing
of the placement of the tube, which they saw as a major intervention they’d rather
avoid. The different effects for different patients needed to be weighed for each
individual.
The second problem with quantifying quality of life in relation to the feeding
tube is that the feeding tube’s shifting identities and the process character of quality
would be hard to uncover through quantitative studies. The feeding tube forms a
complex and unstable intervention, as its effects depend on where and when it is put
to work (see also Warrren and Manderson 2013; Warren et al. 2009). Measuring
quality over time, from anticipation until death, might be a way to catch some of this
process character.
The third, and most fundamental problem is that measurements of effects, be that
on quality or health outcomes, presupposes that both peoples’ physiology as well as
their values are distributed like in a Gaussian curve. This postulates a general
response to treatment, modelled to a shared human physiology where human bodies
respond comparably, if gradually different. An example is a generally ‘increased
fatigue’ as a reaction to a treatment that may be more or less present in more or less
patients in the sample. Individual differences are filtered out by calculating average
responses. If, say, five people are not happy with their tube because it merely
changed the nature of their misery, whereas ten people are happy because the tube
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allowed them to do meaningful things, this would lead to a slight positive effect.
Differences like the appreciation disfigurement by the feeding tube that are crucial
to some, yet trivial to others, would be aggregated in an average score. This would
become visible through large standard deviations and indecisive overall outcomes,
as is the situation today.4
The model of a general physiological response that is normally distributed (as a
Gauss curve) does not fit ‘matters of taste’ or value, and in our case also not the
actual changes in life. The activities an intervention would allow for or hinder may
differ between individuals. The presence or absence of a concern about disfiguring
effects is either present or absent. Both effects are erratically distributed through
their dependence on context. When a population is grouped together because they
share the physiology of the same disease, this does not mean the effects on their
lives are the same, or that the research subjects share same values and appreciations.
‘Matters of taste’ are not general physiological responses, but are unevenly
distributed, as they depend on context, values, cultural preferences, and so on. What
is crucial for the quality of life of one person (e.g. an intact body) may invalidate the
life of the next (who fears choking to death), or horrify the outsider who is not (yet)
confronted with problems that demand drastic solutions (the freshly diagnosed).
Prosthetic and technological aids are likely candidates for this category of
interventions that are shaped in time and interaction with their users (Winance 2006;
Pols 2012; Hoogsteyns and Van der Horst 2013), but also local circumstances can
make the difference. Research in medical anthropology is witness to this. When
disturbed sleep is caused by local spirits, people will not take sleep medication, as
these will weaken their strength to fight the spirits (Bonelli 2013). These pills will
hence have no effect.
The limits of a model of a postulated generalised physiological response demands
more research, also within western biomedical traditions. For example: ‘person-
alised medicine’, is a very different biomedical model to predict individual’s
responses to treatment, by relating these to the particular genetic make-up of an
individual that differs qualitatively from that of another.
To Conclude
This study could only lift a tip of the veil that obscures what is measured through
quality of life research. We used the very specific case of ALS, the very specific
technology of the feeding tube, and we could not access all questionnaires used to
asses quality of life in this area. However, our study shows that the search for
evidence that a treatment has a positive effect on survival as well as quality should
be handled with caution. Questions should be asked whether measuring generalised
responses is appropriate, or when we need more fine-grained methods to uncover
different sets of generalities that emerge in a population. This question could not
4 It is also likely that people with aesthetic concerns would be underrepresented in the trial, as they may
opt to not get a tube.
.
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emerge in research traditions that study events and interpretations separately. Our
suggestion is that we need fine-tuned explorations of what a particular treatment
could mean for different patients, both in terms of the characteristics a treatment
may have, and in terms of the values people attach to these changes, particularly for
complex interventions that gain their effects in relation to context. Different types of
generalities may be discovered, generalities that exist as a common response, but is
not the same for everyone. Examples were some peoples’ heartfelt concern with the
sensuous changes of their body next to others’ indifference to this. These are
clinically relevant responses that count for different subgroups of people. Clusters of
these types of generalities may then be quantified to describe percentages of people
that find them important.
This type of research would do well to dismiss the divide between the study of
physiological events versus peoples’ interpretations. For example, we learnt that
patients with limb-onset ALS are the most vulnerable to misery transformation by
postponing placement or opting for a tube at the end of their trajectory. This
provides them with a very unpleasant operation without much to gain from it. On
the other hand, attention for aesthetic concerns and solutions, such as ways of
covering the tube in situations where others could see it, could enhance the
acceptability of the feeding tube for those who might benefit from it. Characteristics
and their appreciations are best studied together if one wants to learn about patients’
valuings of treatment.
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